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PETITIONER ESTOPPEL FROM 
PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD 
PROCEEDINGS AFTER SAS INSTITUTE 
INC. V. IANCU 
JENNIFER ESCH, PAULA MILLER, STACY LEWIS, & TOM IRVING* 
ABSTRACT 
The Federal Circuit decision in Shaw Industries Group, Inc. v. 
Automated Creel Systems, Inc. addressing petitioner estoppel from Patent 
Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) decisions has not been uniformly 
interpreted by district courts or the PTAB. The Supreme Court’s recent SAS 
Institute Inc. v. Iancu decision, which requires institution or rejection on all 
petitioned claims, moots disagreements among jurisdictions regarding 
estoppel of petitioned, non-instituted grounds because the Federal Circuit 
and the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) have 
interpreted SAS to preclude institution on less than all grounds in a petition. 
Yet, district courts’ conflicting interpretations of Shaw to date demonstrate 
some remnant uncertainty for petitioner estoppel for at least two issues: 
(1) Whether non-petitioned claims and grounds later raised in the 
district court necessarily constitute arguments that “reasonably could have 
[been] raised during [the previous] inter partes review.”1 
(2) Whether petitioned grounds, where the final written decision was 
based on only a subset of grounds and the decision is subsequently 
overturned in favor of the patent owner, remain subject to petitioner 
estoppel.  
 
* Jennifer Esch is a 2L at Harvard Law School and was a 2018 Summer Associate in the Boston office 
of Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner LLP. Paula Miller is an associate, Stacy Lewis is a 
law clerk, and Tom Irving is a partner in the Washington, D.C., office of Finnegan, Henderson, 
Farabow, Garrett & Dunner LLP. 
 
1. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (2012). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This year, the Supreme Court clarified the discretion afforded to the 
PTAB in inter partes reviews (“IPRs”).2 SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu 
restricted the PTAB’s discretion to pick which challenged claims of a 
patent it reviews when initiating an America Invents Act (“AIA”) 
proceeding.3 Now, when deciding to institute a review, the PTAB cannot 
pick a subset of challenged claims to review.4 Instead, the PTAB must 
either decide to review all of the challenged claims or decline review.5 
Although SAS did not decide whether the PTAB must address all grounds 
(as opposed to claims) raised in a petition for IPR, subsequent guidance 
from the PTAB makes clear that the PTAB will no longer opt for a subset 
of grounds for institution.6 The PTAB’s current policy to institute all 
petitioned grounds, as well as all petitioned claims, has been reaffirmed by 
the appellate court as an appropriate approach.7 This change should broadly 
affect PTAB proceedings and parallel district court litigation.8 
SAS also affects the petitioner’s estoppel provision of the IPR statute, 
35 U.S.C. § 315(e). This provision bars a petitioner who has received a 
final written decision (“FWD”) in an IPR from raising or asserting in a later 
litigation or patent review any ground of patentability of a claim that the 
petitioner “raised or reasonably could have raised during [the earlier] inter 
partes review.”9 The Federal Circuit’s interpretation of this provision in 
 
2. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu,138 S. Ct. 1348, 1358–59 (2018). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Guidance on the Impact of SAS on AIA trial proceedings, U.S. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF. (Apr. 
26, 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/patent-trial-and-appeal-
board/trials/guidance-impact-sas-aia-trial (last visited Oct. 14, 2018) [hereinafter “April 26 
Guidance”](“As required by the decision, the PTAB will institute as to all claims or none. At this time, 
if the PTAB institutes a trial, the PTAB will institute on all challenges raised in the petition.”). 
 7. PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“We will treat 
claims and grounds the same in considering the SAS issues currently before us. In light of SAS, the 
USPTO issued a ‘“Guidance’” declaring that the Board will now institute on all claims and all grounds 
included in a petition if it institutes at all . . . We read [the SAS opinion] as interpreting the statute to 
require a simple yes-or-no institution choice respecting a petition, embracing all challenges included in 
the petition, and we have seen no basis for a contrary understanding of the statute in light of SAS.”) 
(citing April 26 Guidance, supra note 6); see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Barry, 891 F.3d 1368, 1371 n.1 
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (noting that, following the SAS decision and the PTAB guidance, the PTAB will 
address every ground, in addition to every claim, raised in the petition on remand, and taking no issue 
with that approach). 
 8. See, e.g., Stephen Schreiner & Maxine Graham, PTAB Institution Decisions in the Wake of 
SAS, LAW360 (July 12, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1062336/ptab-institution-decisions-in-
the-wake-of-sas; Matthew Bultman, Tough Questions Await as PTAB Partial Reviews Get Boot, 
LAW360 (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1037002. 
 9. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (2012). 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1) covers proceedings before the PTAB while 
35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) covers proceedings in federal courts and before the ITC.  
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Shaw10 has been inconsistently interpreted by various district courts and the 
PTAB.11 SAS and subsequent PTAB guidance may moot past court splits 
on estoppel from non-instituted claims and grounds—since any IPR 
reaching a FWD will see all petitioned claims and grounds instituted and 
addressed. However, uncertainty remains for (1) non-petitioned claims and 
grounds and (2) petitioned grounds where the FWD had addressed only a 
subset of grounds (e.g., instituted prior to SAS or where parties have 
stipulated to dropping certain grounds) and the decision is subsequently 
overturned in favor of the patent owner. This article will outline this 
remaining uncertainty and suggest ways to mitigate it. 
II. JURISDICTIONAL SPLIT IN THE APPLICATION OF ESTOPPEL 
In Shaw, the Federal Circuit held that the “plain language” of § 315(e) 
prohibits the application of estoppel to grounds that were included in an 
IPR petition (“petitioned grounds”) but not instituted, reasoning that an 
“IPR does not begin until it is instituted,” and thus grounds not instituted 
were not raised, and could not reasonably have been raised, during the IPR 
proper.12 
Thus, after Shaw many district courts declined to apply § 315(e) 
estoppel to petitioned but denied grounds, regardless of the reason 
institution was denied.13 However, at least one district court, the Eastern 
District of Texas, estopped an accused infringer from asserting petitioned, 
non-instituted grounds as later district court invalidity defenses, where such 
grounds had been rejected by the PTAB on their merits.14 This court held 
that non-instituted grounds were only protected from estoppel under Shaw 
when institution was denied for procedural reasons.15 Thus, district courts 
 
 10. Shaw Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc., 817 F.3d 1293, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 11. See Linda A. Wadler, Barbara R. Rudolph & Meredith H. Boerschlein, IPR Estoppel: Current 
District Court Trends and Practice Tips, 30 No. 1 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 3 (2018) (discussing the 
interpretation of Shaw by district courts and the PTAB and making practice recommendations prior to 
the SAS decision); Steven J. Schwarz, Tamatane J. Aga, Kristin M. Adams & Katherine C. Dearing, 
Savvy Shaw-ping: A Strategic Approach to AIA Estoppel, 17 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 67 (2018) 
(also discussing the interpretation of Shaw by district courts and the PTAB and making practice 
recommendations prior to the SAS decision); Andrew Moshirnia, I Fought the Shaw: A Game Theory 
Framework and Approach to the District Courts’ Struggle with IPR Estoppel, 17 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. 
PROP. 411 (2018) (discussing the interpretation of Shaw by district courts and the PTAB and suggesting 
hypothetical trends to test). 
 12. Shaw Indus. Grp., 817 F.3d at 1300. 
 13. See, e.g., Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp. v. Snap-On Inc., 271 F. Supp. 3d 990, 1028–29 (E.D. 
Wis. 2017) (discussing holdings from different district courts regarding the application of estoppel to 
non-instituted grounds); see also Moshirnia, supra note 12, at 417. 
 14. Biscotti Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2-13-cv-01015-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL 2526231, at *7 (E.D. 
Tex. May 11, 2017). 
 15. Id. 
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disagreed on the meaning of Shaw, and the state of estoppel, for petitioned 
but non-instituted claims and grounds. 
That conflict is now moot. SAS eliminated the possibility of 
proceedings and a FWD on only some of the petitioned claims. Following 
SAS, PTAB policy, affirmed by the Federal Circuit, has eliminated the 
possibility of proceedings and FWD on a subset of petitioned grounds.16 
And even standing alone, SAS may contribute to resolving significant 
jurisdictional disagreements regarding the application of estoppel to non-
petitioned grounds. While district courts and the PTAB had in the past split 
as to how to interpret Shaw regarding non-petitioned grounds, a recent 
district court opinion from the District of Massachusetts concluded that 
SAS implied that “reasonably could have [been] raised” would have to refer 
to non-petitioned grounds, as otherwise, the words “reasonably could have 
[been] raised” would have no meaning.17 
A. Cases finding no estoppel to non-petitioned grounds 
Before SAS several district courts, including the District of Delaware, 
the District of Massachusetts, and the Northern District of California, read 
Shaw as narrowly circumscribing petitioner’s estoppel only to grounds that 
were actually raised during an IPR (i.e., after institution), and declined to 
apply petitioner estoppel to any grounds not put forward in the original IPR 
petition. 
A District of Delaware court was the first to apply Shaw. In 
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Toshiba Corp., patent owner Intellectual 
Ventures moved for summary judgment to prevent accused infringer 
Toshiba from raising invalidity challenges against a patent previously 
challenged by Toshiba in an instituted IPR that resulted in an unsuccessful 
FWD.18 Intellectual Ventures argued that invalidity grounds based on 
publicly available patents and printed publications not cited in the IPR 
petition should be estopped because these references reasonably could have 
been raised, i.e., included in the petition.19 While the district court 
acknowledged that Intellectual Venture’s argument was “perfectly 
plausible” in that “additional obviousness grounds based on public 
 
 16. See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text; SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu,138 S. Ct. 1348, 1358–59 
(2018). 
 17. SiOnyx, LLC v. Hamamatsu Photonics K.K., No. 15:13488-FDS, 2018 WL 4177941, at *19 
(D. Mass. Aug. 30, 2018). 
 18. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Toshiba Corp., 221 F. Supp. 3d 534, 553–54 (D. Del. 2016). 
 19. Id. Not all forms of prior art may be asserted in an IPR; only printed publications and prior-art 
patents are permitted. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012). 
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documents” could have been raised “at the outset of [the] IPR petition,” the 
district court stated that the Federal Circuit construed § 315(e) “quite 
literally” in Shaw when it determined that a ground petitioned but not 
instituted had not been raised during the IPR (i.e., after institution), and 
was thus not estopped.20 Thus, Judge Robinson, in one of her last major 
cases before announcing her retirement, begrudgingly denied summary 
judgment for Intellectual Ventures because she could not “divine a 
reasoned way around the Federal Circuit’s decision in Shaw,” which 
required restricting § 315(e) estoppel to grounds raised or raisable during 
an IPR (as opposed to raised or raisable in a petition) despite her opinion 
that this interpretation “confounds the very purpose” of IPRs.21 The 
shielding of non-petitioned grounds from estoppel resulting from this 
reading of Shaw provides significant protection and flexibility for patent 
challengers engaged in both IPR and district court proceedings. 
Since then, at least two other district courts similarly read Shaw as 
preventing the application of estoppel to non-petitioned grounds. In Finjan, 
Inc. v. Blue Coat Systems, LLC, a Northern District of California court 
stated that it would follow the Delaware court’s interpretation of Shaw and 
would limit estoppel to the “precise combinations” of unpatentability on 
which an IPR was instituted.22 A District of Massachusetts court similarly 
considered itself bound by Shaw not to apply estoppel to non-petitioned 
grounds despite acknowledging there was “much appeal” in a reading of § 
315(e) that would encompass grounds that could have been, but were not, 
raised in a prior petition for IPR.23 
In district courts reading Shaw this way, patent challengers might thus 
benefit from being able to assert any non-petitioned grounds in later district 
court proceedings, even if these grounds could have been presented in the 
prior IPR petition. Thus, these districts could be disfavored venues for 
patent assertors seeking rigorous application of estoppel over prior PTAB 
challenges. Were this reading of Shaw to control, it would reduce the 
pressure on petitioners to raise all possible patentability grounds when 
petitioning for IPR. 
 
 20. Intellectual Ventures I, 221 F. Supp. 3d at 553.  
 21. Id. at 554. 
 22. Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., LLC, 283 F. Supp. 3d 839, 856 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
 23. Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Wangs Alliance. Corp., No. CV 14-12298-DJC, 2018 WL 
283893, at *4 (D. Mass. Jan. 2, 2018) (denying summary judgment that invalidity contentions not raised 
in the accused infringer’s IPR petition were estopped). 
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B. Cases finding estoppel did apply to non-petitioned grounds 
In contrast to the strict application of Shaw by some district courts, the 
PTAB has broadly applied § 315(e) estoppel to all petitioned and even non-
petitioned grounds, generally applying a flexible standard of “reasonably 
could have been raised during the inter partes review” that includes non-
petitioned grounds based on “prior art which a skilled searcher conducting 
a diligent search reasonably could have been expected to discover.”24 
While this position finds support in the AIA’s legislative history, it appears 
to disregard the Federal Circuit’s position in Shaw that § 315(e)’s language 
“during [an] inter partes review” refers to the post-institution phase of an 
IPR, and thus that estoppel applies only to grounds raised (or reasonably 
raisable) during an instituted IPR proceeding (as opposed to in a petition).25 
Several district courts have followed this broader reading of Shaw, 
allowing for application of estoppel to non-petitioned grounds. 
The Western District of Wisconsin provided one of the earliest district 
court opinions declining to apply Shaw to all non-petitioned grounds, 
finding such grounds estopped. In Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Meyer 
Products LLC, after unsuccessfully challenging a patent in an IPR that 
resulted in a FWD, the accused infringer, Meyer, raised invalidity 
contentions in litigation against the patent owner, Douglas.26 Meyer 
asserted all of the grounds and claims it had previously included in its 
petition for the IPR (that were then denied institution) as well as new 
grounds based on two additional printed publication prior art references.27 
In holding that Meyer was estopped from asserting the new grounds 
(but not the previously petitioned grounds), the district court reasoned that 
“Shaw’s narrow view of § 315(e) estoppel undermines the purported 
efficiency of IPR, especially if it were applied to allow post-IPR assertion 
of non-petitioned grounds” that reasonably could have been raised.28 
Allowing a petitioner to assert new non-petitioned grounds that could 
reasonably have been raised would transform an IPR into “an additional 
 
 24. See, e.g., Apotex Inc. v. Wyeth LLC, No. IPR2015-00873, Paper 8 at 6 (P.T.A.B Sept. 16, 
2015) (decision issued pre-Shaw, but outlining standards followed post-Shaw); Praxair Distrib., Inc. v. 
INO Therapeutics LLC, No. IPR2016-00781, Paper 10 at 7 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 25, 2016); Great West Cas. 
Co. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, No. IPR2016-01534, Paper 13 at 11–15 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 15, 2017). 
 25. Apotex, No. IPR2015-00873, at 6 (quoting 157 CONG. REC. S1375 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) 
(statement of Sen. Grassley); Shaw Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc., 817 F.3d 1293, 
1300 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 26. Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Meyer Products LLC, No. 14-cv-886-JDP, 2017 WL 1382556, at 
*2 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 18, 2017). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at *4. 
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step” of litigating patentability prior to doing so in the district court instead 
of an “alternative” and would enable a defendant to “hold a second-string 
invalidity case in reserve in case the IPR does not go defendant’s way.”29 
Explicitly disagreeing with the Shaw interpretation of “during” and also 
suggesting Shaw’s procedural posture was distinguishable, the district court 
stated that “until Shaw is limited or reconsidered” it would not apply 
estoppel to non-instituted grounds, but would estop “grounds not asserted 
in the IPR petition, so long as they are based on prior art that could have 
been found by a skilled searcher’s diligent search.”30 The court’s decision 
in Douglas thus served as an early example of an accused infringer having 
non-petitioned grounds denied later consideration. 
Other district courts have similarly concluded that declining to apply 
estoppel to some non-petitioned grounds while applying it to grounds 
actually raised but denied was counterintuitive, would frustrate the purpose 
of AIA reviews, and was not required by Shaw. An Eastern District of 
Texas court came to this conclusion in Biscotti Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 
stating that accused infringers are estopped from asserting at trial “grounds 
not included in a petition that a ‘skilled searcher conducting a diligent 
search reasonably could have been expected to discover.’”31 Several 
additional district courts have reached similar conclusions, including the 
Eastern District of Virginia,32 the Eastern District of Wisconsin,33 the 
Northern District of Illinois,34 and the District of Delaware (albeit with a 
judge sitting by designation).35 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at *5. 
 31. Biscotti Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2:13-cv-01015-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL 2526231, at *7 (E.D. 
Tex. May 11, 2017). 
 32. See Cobalt Boats, LLC v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., No. 2:15cv21, 2017 WL 2605977, at *3 (E.D. 
Va. June 5, 2017) (“The Court ADOPTS the narrow reading of Shaw and FINDS that estoppel applies 
to grounds that the petitioner raised at the IPR itself and could have raised in the IPR petition or at the 
IPR itself. The court in Shaw was only making observations in dicta, and it had no occasion to consider 
restricting estoppel in the manner that other districts have interpreted it. Furthermore, the broad reading 
of Shaw renders the IPR estoppel provisions essentially meaningless because parties may pursue two 
rounds of invalidity arguments as long as they carefully craft their IPR petition. It would waste this 
Court’s time to allow a stay for a year during IPR proceedings and then review invalidity arguments 
that Defendants could (and perhaps should) have raised in their IPR petition. The Court’s reading of 
Shaw gives effect to every word in the statute while also recognizing the effect of the USPTO’s 
decision on an IPR petition.”). 
 33. See Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp. v. Snap-On Inc., 271 F. Supp. 3d 990, 1031–33 (E.D. Wis. 
2017) (applying petitioner’s estoppel to non-petitioned grounds based on references included in IPR or 
on references that patent owner demonstrated were readily available through reasonably diligent 
search). 
 34. See Oil-Dri Corp. of Am. v. Nestle Purina Petcare Co., No. 15-CV-1067, 2017 WL 3278915, 
at *9 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2017) (finding no Federal Circuit guidance directly on point as to whether § 
315(e) applies to non-petitioned ground, but concluding that “§ 315(e) applies to nonpetitioned grounds 
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A recent decision suggests that this reading of Shaw could be adopted 
broadly in view of the SAS holding. In SiOnyx LLC v. Hamamatsu 
Photonics K.K., a District of Massachusetts court considered the question 
of grounds and claims that reasonably could have been raised in a petition, 
but were not, and suggested they should be estopped.36 The court 
acknowledged that “[p]rior to SAS, a minority of district courts had held 
that only grounds actually raised in the petition could count as grounds that 
‘reasonably could have been raised,’” but the court offered that “[a]fter 
SAS, that cannot be correct.”37 According to the court, because there will no 
longer be such a thing as a petitioned, non-instituted ground in IPRs 
leading to FWDs after SAS, the words “reasonably could have raised” in § 
315(e) now “must refer to grounds that were not actually in the IPR 
petition, but reasonably could have been included” in order for them to 
have any meaning at all.38 The court then acknowledged the interpretation 
of “reasonably could have raised” as including “any patent or printed 
publication that a petitioner actually knew about or that ‘a skilled searcher 
conducting a diligent search reasonably could have been expected to 
discover’” as having been adopted by several district courts. However, the 
court declined to apply estoppel at the summary judgment phase because a 
genuine question of fact existed “as to whether a diligent, skilled searcher 
would have found” the reference in question.39 
Whether SAS indeed resolves the jurisdictional split as to the estoppel 
of non-petitioned grounds that reasonably could have been raised in the 
petition will be a question for PTAB practitioners to follow closely in the 
coming months. 
III. DEFINING PETITIONED GROUNDS 
If Shaw is read in a manner that exempts non-petitioned grounds from 
estoppel, a second question is raised—what defines “petitioned” grounds? 
Do subsets or combinations of prior art references relied on in a petition 
 
with respect to patent claims for which the PTAB issued a final written decision” after considering plain 
language of statute, opinions of other district courts, purpose of IPRs, fairness, and due process). 
 35. See Parallel Networks Licensing, LLC v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 13-2072 (KAJ), 2017 
WL 1045912, at *11–12 (D. Del. Feb. 22, 2017) appeal dismissed, No. 2017-2042, 2017 WL 5897705 
(Fed. Cir. Sept. 20, 2017), aff’d, 721 F. App’x 994 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (J. Jordan, Circuit judge sitting by 
designation) (applying estoppel to grounds that accused infringer had incorporated as invalidity 
contentions and included in expert reports in court proceedings prior to IPR). 
 36. SiOnyx, LLC v. Hamamatsu Photonics K.K., No. 15:13488-FDS, 2018 WL 4177941, at *19 
(D. Mass. Aug. 30, 2018). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at *19–20. 
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count as “petitioned grounds”? Or new grounds? In this way, these can be 
seen as “closer cases” for the application of estoppel than grounds based on 
different prior art. For example, while the Northern District of California 
has declined to apply estoppel to non-petitioned grounds,40 decisions from 
this district have treated some subsets of larger combinations of prior art 
references included in an instituted IPR challenge as equivalent to the 
instituted grounds.41 
In Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., a district 
court litigation was stayed pending resolution of IPRs requested by the 
accused infringer, LG.42 After the PTAB upheld the patentability of one of 
the challenged claims in view of two asserted combinations of references, 
(using the court’s shorthand) Lindholm in view of Kurihara and Rich in 
view of Kurihara, the district court held that LG was also estopped from 
asserting invalidity on the basis of Lindholm or Rich as stand-alone 
references.43 Thus, even in districts where patent challengers may 
ostensibly raise non-petitioned grounds without fear of estoppel, they may 
face limitations on what grounds they may raise, with some combination 
grounds not expressly detailed in their petition still being considered 
“petitioned” if based solely on unasserted combinations or subsets of prior 
art found in the petition. 
Some courts may treat individual references differently despite 
generally estopping subsets of previously asserted references. In Oil-Dri 
Corp. of America v. Nestle Purina Petcare Co., a court in the Northern 
District of Illinois held the accused infringer, Purina, was not estopped 
from raising invalidity arguments based on individual prior art references 
previously considered in a FWD.44 The court reasoned that obviousness 
based on a combination may be rejected by the PTAB based on insufficient 
articulation of a motivation to combine.45 The court also considered the 
procedural posture, where the PTAB explicitly excluded an analysis of 
either prior art reference alone from its decision. 46 Such an approach may 
 
 40. See Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., LLC, 283 F. Supp. 3d 839, 856 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
 41. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., No. 14-cv-01012-SI, 2017 WL 2774339, at 
*6 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2017). 
 42. Id. at *1. 
 43. Id. at *6; see also Biscotti Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2:13-cv-01015-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL 
2526231, at *8 (E.D. Tex. May 11, 2017) (recommending that combination of “Kenoyer” and “Briere” 
references be estopped because the PTAB instituted and rejected a challenge based on the combination 
of the Kenoyer, Briere, and “Hurley” references) (note that Biscotti does not read Shaw as preventing 
application of estoppel to non-petitioned grounds). 
 44. Oil-Dri Corp. of Am. v. Nestle Purina Petcare Co., No. 15-cv-1067, 2017 WL 3278915, at *5–
6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2017). 
 45. Id. at *6. 
 46. Id. 
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provide additional options for patent challengers after an unsuccessful IPR 
but may have limited applicability, as the district court also noted that here, 
the PTAB had “explicitly considered in its final written decision” whether 
the individual references were “properly before it” and concluded that they 
were not.47 
Subsets of references previously included in petitions may also be 
asserted as novel, non-petitioned grounds when raised in combination with 
prior art not previously included. In Advanced Micro Devices the patent 
owner, Advanced Micro Devices, sought to exclude the Kurihara reference, 
included in two combinations considered and rejected by the PTAB, in its 
entirety.48 While the district court ruled that LG was barred from asserting 
any subsets of previously asserted combinations, it found that IPR estoppel 
does not “effect a bar to LG’s assertion of all combinations including [the 
reference] . . .”49 Thus, patent challengers may rely on prior art previously 
asserted in an IPR, so long as this art is asserted in combination with 
additional references, that either could not have been raised previously (in 
districts applying estoppel to non-petitioned grounds) or were not raised 
previously (in districts declining to apply estoppel to non-petitioned 
grounds). 
Clearly, the nuances of estoppel after Shaw dictate careful study of the 
cases that came both before and after SAS. 
IV. PETITIONED GROUNDS INSTITUTED BUT NOT RELIED ON IN THE 
FINAL WRITTEN DECISION 
In a recent decision contending with the SAS transition, the Federal 
Circuit set out, in an aside, a “distinct question”: “whether, after instituting 
on the entire petition” the PTAB may issue a FWD in which it “decide[s] 
the merits of certain challenges and then find others moot.”50 This remark 
alludes to the possibility of some instituted grounds being considered moot 
and left “undecided” in a FWD, but being “subject to revival if appellate 
review of the decided challenges renders the undecided ones no longer 
moot.”51  
 
 47. Id. at *5. 
 48. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., No. 14-cv-01012-SI, 2017 WL 2774339, at 
*6 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2017). 
 49. Id.; see also Biscotti Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2:13-cv-01015-JRG-RSP, 2017 WL 
2526231, at *8 (E.D. Tex. May 11, 2017) (estoppel holding “extends only to subsets of . . . grounds”) 
(emphasis in original). 
 50. PGS Geophysical AS v. Iancu, 891 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 51. Id. Practitioners have noted that since the SAS decision, some decisions instituting review have 
failed to analyze all claims and all grounds, despite instituting on all claims and grounds. It remains to 
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In this situation, there is some potential for disagreement over whether 
the undecided grounds would be subject to § 315(e) estoppel. If the PTAB 
is permitted to treat some challenges as moot in drafting FWDs that find 
the patent unpatentable on other grounds, uncertainty may arise if the 
decided grounds are vacated and remanded on appeal without Federal 
Circuit comment on the undecided grounds. District courts might then 
disagree as to whether a valid FWD exists for the undecided grounds, and 
thus whether any estoppel applies. And it is likewise unclear how the 
Courts will treat grounds that were instituted but stipulated to by the 
parties. 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In light of persisting uncertainty regarding the application of estoppel 
to non-petitioned grounds, petitioners can take proactive steps: 
• Be deliberate about which claims and grounds to include in a 
petition; 
• Assert non-printed publication prior art in subsequent non-IPR 
proceedings. 
A. Be deliberate about which claims and grounds to include in a 
petition 
Recent PTAB orders in the context of a covered business method and 
IPR review suggest that avoiding estoppel does not provide the “good 
cause” required to allow a petitioner to withdraw grounds from 
consideration after institution.52 Thus, given the post-SAS PTAB Guidance 
to institute either all petitioned claims and grounds or none, petitioners 
should carefully consider which references are included in a petition. If 
litigation is likely to take place in a jurisdiction not applying estoppel to 
non-petitioned grounds, it is better to focus on the strongest grounds rather 
than load a petition with alternative grounds. For jurisdictions applying 
estoppel to non-petitioned grounds (the majority position, and potentially 
the consensus position after SAS), consider raising alternative grounds in a 
second petition. Under Shaw, these grounds should be shielded from 
estoppel if no review is instituted on that second petition. The post-SAS 
 
be seen if such a “gap between the institution analysis and the challenges presented in the petition” will 
impact final written decisions and whether some grounds, while instituted, might be considered moot. 
Schreiner & Graham, supra note 9. 
 52. Dish Network Corp. v. Customedia Techs., No. CBM2017-00019, Paper 50 at 2 (P.T.A.B. 
May 16, 2018); Instrumentation Lab. Co. v. Hemosonics, LLC, No. IPR2017-00855, Paper 43 at 8 
(P.T.A.B. July 11, 2018). 
 
2019        PETITIONER ESTOPPEL FROM PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD 21 
 
PTAB Guidance does not require institution on all of the multiple petitions 
directed to the same patent just because the ground in another petition 
challenging the same patent are instituted. 
B. In subsequent non-IPR proceedings, assert non-printed publication 
prior art 
Non-printed publication prior art (e.g., physical specimens, evidence 
of prior sales or public uses) may be particularly valuable invalidity 
grounds in proceedings following a FWD. Even when such art is somewhat 
connected to printed publications that were, or could have been, raised, in 
the IPR, courts have applied a stringent standard against extending estoppel 
to such non-printed publication prior art. In Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp. v. 
Snap-On Inc., the accused infringer Snap-On was permitted to rely on 
several non-printed publication prior art references (physical specimens 
and videos). The court found these references exempt from estoppel 
because it was not clear that Snap-On could have been expected to locate 
printed publications associated with the physical devices and videos in its 
possession.53 In another case, ZitoVault LLC v. International Business 
Machines Corporation, the patent owner, ZitoVault, argued that the 
accused infringer, IBM, should not be able to “avoid statutory estoppel 
simply by relying on a system where all of the teachings of the system also 
exist in patents or printed publications because [those patent or printed 
publications] reasonably could have been raised during the IPR.”54 The 
district court rejected this argument on the simple basis that systems are 
excluded as prior art from IPR proceedings and that arguments attempting 
to link systems to printed publication have consistently failed.55 Other 
district courts have come to similar conclusions.56 
 
 53. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp. v. Snap-On Inc., 271 F. Supp. 3d 990, 1032–33 (E.D. Wis. 2017). 
 54. ZitoVault LLC v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 3:16-cv-0962-M, 2018 WL 2971178, at *4 
(N.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 2018). 
 55. Id. 
 56. See, e.g., Depomed, Inc. v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. CV 13-571 (MLC), 2016 WL 8677317, 
at *6 (D.N.J. Nov. 4, 2016) (on-sale bar and § 102(g) defenses not estopped because they could not 
have been raised during IPRs due to scope limit of IPRs to § 102 and § 103 grounds based on printed 
publications); Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. Kemper Corp., No. 6:16-CV-0081, 2016 WL 7634422, at 
*3 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2016) (discussing scope of statutory estoppel in context of whether IPR will 
simplify issues before the court and noting that “defendants have considerable latitude in using prior art 
systems (for example, software) embodying the same patents or printed publications placed before the 
USPTO in IPR proceedings.”). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
By changing how the PTAB institutes AIA petitions, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in SAS should eliminate aspects of the post-Shaw 
uncertainty regarding the scope of petitioner’s estoppel and may even 
resolve some of the most significant disagreements between district courts’ 
applications of Shaw as to whether non-petitioned grounds are subject to 
estoppel. Still, until more district courts take up this question, or until the 
Federal Circuit revisits Shaw in light of SAS, uncertainty regarding the 
estoppel effects of AIA reviews remains. Careful consideration should be 
given to estoppel effects when crafting petitions and selecting prior art to 
be asserted. 
